Abstract: This paper investigates the mortgage lending of banks operating in multiple U.S. metropolitan areas during the housing market collapse of [2007][2008][2009]. Some metro areas in the U.S. suffered much greater mortgage defaults than others. We use this regional variation to identify whether high mortgage delinquencies in some markets affected multi-market banks' mortgage lending in other markets. Our results show that multi-market banks reduced local mortgage lending in response to delinquencies in other markets, consistent with the view that local economic shocks can be transmitted to other regions through banks' internal capital markets. This spillover effect was greatest in peripheral markets where multi-market banks do a small share of their lending. We find that securitized lending may have mitigated the decline in portfolio lending, but the effect on total lending is economically significant. The mechanism of the transmission appears to be through changes in bank capital and new information about the mortgage market. Overall, our findings point to contagion of local economic shocks as a "dark side" to the geographic diversification of multimarket banks.
Introduction
The geographic diversification of financial institutions has many benefits.
Geographically diversified institutions are less exposed to local, idiosyncratic shocks (Hughes et al. 1996 and 1998 , Morgan, Rime, and Strahan 2004 and, due to their internal capital markets, these institutions can raise capital at lower cost and allocate capital more efficiently. However, there is a potential "dark side" of geographic diversification. By operating in multiple geographic regions, multi-market banks can create a financial linkage between otherwise unrelated local economies. This interconnectedness due to multi-market banks can result in contagion from one local market to another, with negative economic shocks being transmitted through the financial system. The U.S. housing market collapse of [2007] [2008] [2009] provides unique conditions for understanding how geographically concentrated shocks can spread to other regions. A key feature of the housing downturn was that some areas suffered much larger declines in home prices and increases in mortgage delinquencies than other areas. California and Florida experienced very large decreases in housing prices and increases in mortgage delinquency rates.
On the other hand, many areas in the middle of the country experienced only moderate declines in housing prices and increases in delinquency rates. These differences in the severity of the housing downturn raise the question of whether shocks in the hardest-hit housing markets spread to other areas of the country, and if so, how they spread.
In this paper we seek to shed light on the role of financial institutions in the spread of residential mortgage market shocks across U.S. cities during the crisis. We examine whether the geographic diversification of the banking sector increased the sensitivity of regional mortgage markets to outside economic shocks. More specifically, we test the hypothesis that multi-market 3 banks--those making mortgage loans in multiple metropolitan areas-transmitted mortgage default shocks across markets during the crisis by tightening loan supply in less affected markets.
A finding that multi-market banks with heavy exposure to California or Florida contracted their mortgage lending in areas of the country with fewer mortgage losses would indicate adverse contagion across markets. In other words, heavy mortgage losses in one market could lead to reduced mortgage credit in other markets, which could slow housing activity and accelerate house price decline in those markets if the contraction was not fully offset by credit from other sources.
Our study builds on a long literature focusing mostly on international banking and the transmission of shocks across countries (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 2000) . The growing interconnectedness of global financial institutions is a key motivation to understand this issue, and the resulting transmission of shocks across country borders during the recent crisis has been well documented (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2010, Popov and Udell 2010) . The advantage of our approach is that we narrow our focus to the financial market where the crisis began: the U.S. residential mortgage market. Our analysis exploits two important sources of heterogeneity in the U.S. mortgage market-variation in mortgage losses across regions due to differences in the severity of the housing downturn and variation in multi-market banks' regional exposures to mortgage losses due to differences in the location of the banks' past lending. Specifically, we test whether an unusually large increase in mortgage delinquencies in one region causes multimarket banks that have been lending heavily in that region to reduce mortgage lending in the other regions in which they operate.
In principle, an economic shock in another region could affect a multi-market bank's local lending through three possible channels. First, if the outside shock reduces a multi-market 4 bank's overall capital or supply of deposits-if the shock affects overall loan supply-the bank may decrease local lending to help restore its capital adequacy or liquidity. Second, if the outside shock is perceived by the bank to reduce the credit demands or creditworthiness of borrowers in those markets-if the shock affects outside loan demand-the bank may increase local lending as it shifts lending from its other markets. Third, if the outside shock causes the bank to become more pessimistic about the credit demands or creditworthiness of borrowers in all its markets, including the local market-if the shock serves as a source of information about local loan demand--the bank may decrease local lending. In principle, therefore, multi-market banks could respond to outside shocks by decreasing local lending (if the shock affects the bank's overall loan supply or beliefs about local loan demand) or by increasing local lending (if the shock affects the bank's outside loan demand). For convenience, we say that regional economic shocks have a spillover effect if local lending falls and a substitution effect if local lending rises.
Our results indicate that multi-market banks decreased local mortgage lending in response to increases in mortgage delinquency rates in other markets to which they were heavily exposed-i.e., that the spillover effect of outside mortgage-related shocks outweighed the substitution effect. Specifically, we find that the growth in a multi-market bank's local mortgage lending during the crisis was negatively related to the increase in the average delinquency rate in the bank's other markets during the period leading up to the crisis. This finding is consistent with the view that geographic diversification in banking has a "dark side" because it increases the vulnerability of markets to outside economic shocks.
We also explore whether the sensitivity of local lending to outside economic shocks depends on how important the local market is to a multi-market bank's overall lending. We refer 5 to a market that accounts for less than half of a multi-market bank's lending as a peripheral market and a market that accounts for more than half of its lending as a core market. We also distinguish between moderately peripheral markets, defined as those accounting for one to 50 percent of the bank's mortgage lending, and highly peripheral markets, those accounting for less than one percent of the bank's mortgage lending.
In principle, the spillover effect of outside shocks should be stronger in a multi-market bank's peripheral markets than its core markets, whether the effect is due to a decline in the bank's overall capital or a revision in the bank's beliefs about the creditworthiness of local borrowers. For example, an increase in mortgage losses in other markets should have a greater tendency to reduce the bank's overall capital, and thus a greater tendency to reduce the bank's local lending, if the banks' other markets account for a large share of its lending-i.e. if the local market is peripheral. Similarly, if a multi-market bank lacks good information about local conditions and bases its estimate of local borrower creditworthiness partly on developments in its other markets, the bank should place more weight on that information if the other markets account for a large share of its lending. In both cases, another factor may also come into play: lending may be more sensitive to outside economic shocks in peripheral markets than core markets because banks are more likely to "cut and run" from the markets in which they have less long-term interest. Consistent with these arguments, we find that outside economic shocks led multi-market banks to reduce local lending more if the market was peripheral than core, and more if the market was highly peripheral than moderately peripheral.
Another issue addressed in this paper is whether the transmission of shocks across markets is mitigated by banks' ability to offset changes in portfolio lending (loans originated and kept on the books) with changes in securitized lending (loans originated and sold to non-6 affiliates). A bank that can easily shift between portfolio and securitized lending may not need to decrease its total lending as much in response to adverse loan supply shocks in its other markets.
In particular, the bank could opt to sell some of the local loans it had been planning to originate and hold. By so doing, the bank could make the desired adjustment in the size and risk of its overall portfolio while increasing its fee income from loan sales. Thus, the ability of multimarket banks to shift between portfolio lending and securitized lending should dampen the response of total lending to the outside shock. Our results suggest that the decline in mortgage lending in response to outside economic shocks was mitigated--but only partially--by a tendency for multi-market banks to increase securitized lending at the same time they reduced portfolio lending.
Lastly, we examine the two alternative explanations for the spillover effect-a reduction in the bank's overall capital due to the outside shock, or a downward revision in the bank's beliefs about the credit demands or creditworthiness of local borrowers. We explore these two channels by examining how the strength of the spillover depends on the exposure of the bank's capital to mortgage losses (measured by the size of the bank's residential real estate portfolio relative to its equity) and on the bank's informational disadvantage in the local market (measured by the distance of the market from the bank's headquarters). We find evidence that in moderately peripheral markets, the contraction in local portfolio lending in response to external losses is greater for banks with greater capital exposure and for markets located farther from headquarters. This evidence suggests that the capital and information channels both contribute to the spillover of mortgage-related shocks to other markets.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the data as well as some descriptive statistics and Section 4 7 explains the empirical methodology. Section 5 describes the regression results for the baseline model and some extensions. Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
Previous research has examined the benefits of banks' geographic diversification for reducing the sensitivity of local bank lending to local economic shocks. Geographic deregulation of the U.S. banking sector led to a decline in state-level economic volatility, which suggests that geographic diversification helps banks offset local supply shocks (Morgan, Rime and Strahan 2004) . Consistent with this view of reduced local sensitivity, a severe downturn in the local economy reduces local lending more at single-market banks than at multi-market banks with Similarly, Schnable (2010) investigates the effect of the Russian debt crisis of 1998 on bank lending in Peru and finds that lending from foreign-owned banks fell more than lending from domestic banks without access to foreign credit. In the financial contagion literature, the tendency for a bank to reduce lending in one country after suffering an unexpected loss in another country is commonly referred to as the "common lender" effect (Van Rijckehem and
Weder 2003).
More recent papers investigate the existence of international cross-market spillovers during the [2007] [2008] [2009] financial crisis. Examining loan applications by small and medium-sized businesses in emerging Europe, Popov and Udell (2010) find that loan rejection rates increased most in those markets in which foreign banks with financially distressed parents had the highest presence. Emerging markets also experienced the biggest declines in lending from developed countries with the greatest vulnerability to dollar funding shocks, suggesting that global banking has made emerging markets more susceptible to loan supply shocks in the developed world (Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008) . These international findings on the financial crisis are consistent 9 with the view that geographic diversification increases the sensitivity of local lending to outside loan supply shocks.
Our work builds on the previous literature by studying the home mortgage market and the role of multi-market banks in the spillover of housing market shocks across metro areas in the U.S. during the financial crisis. Using the regional variation in mortgage lending by multimarket banks and the corresponding exposures to large mortgage losses in certain markets, we can identify the changes in local bank lending due to external loan supply shocks. We also believe our study is unique in testing whether the magnitude of the spillover from outside shocks depends on the share of the local market in the bank's total mortgage lending. As explained in the Introduction, plausible explanations for the spillover effect suggest that the effect should be greater in local markets that account for a small share of the bank's total lending (peripheral markets) than in markets that account for a large share of total lending (core markets).
Another contribution of our study is to investigate whether the spillover effect occurs through the adverse impact of the outside shock on the bank's overall capital or through an update in the bank's beliefs about the creditworthiness of local borrowers. A large empirical literature has examined the effect of shocks to bank capital on bank lending. Much of this literature grew out of the U.S. credit crunch of the early 1990s, when it became clear that heavy losses on commercial real estate loans contributed to a sharp cutback in bank lending due to reduced bank capital (Bernanke and Lown 1991, Sharpe 1995) . Other studies have examined the effect of changes in bank capital on lending in more recent periods (Berrospide and Edge 2010 , Francis and Osborne 2009 , Mora and Logan 2010 , Albertazzi and Marchetti 2010 . Identifying the effect on bank lending of a decrease in bank capital is difficult because observed decreases in lending could be due to the deterioration in the creditworthiness of prospective borrowers rather than a decline in capital (Sharpe 1995) . Similar to Peek and Rosengren 2000, we address the endogeneity issue by looking at the response of local lending to loan losses in outside markets rather than loan losses in the local market. In addition, we test whether the spillover effect is stronger for banks with high exposure of capital to mortgages, which would provide support for the existence of a capital channel.
Less attention has been paid in the literature to our alternative explanation for the Our study contributes to the emerging literature on information problems at multi-market banks by testing whether the spillover effect increases with distance of the local market from bank headquarters. Such a finding would be consistent with the idea that a multi-market bank puts more weight on developments in other markets, the less information it has about the local markets.
Data and sample statistics
Our mortgage lending data consist of regulatory filings collected annually under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). These data include information on the location of the borrower, allowing us to compute mortgage originations at the county and metro-area levels. We include loans that are owner-occupied, conventional (i.e., non-government guaranteed), for home purchase, and larger than $50,000 (as a proxy for first liens). For portfolio lending, we include only those loans that are either held by the originator or sold to an affiliate, and only those loans that are originated by banks, thrifts, or their affiliates. For total lending, we add those loans that are sold to government sponsored entities (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) or nonaffiliates in the private sector. The data are aggregated by bank holding company and are adjusted for bank mergers to ensure that growth in a banking organization's mortgage originations in a market is not artificially inflated by the acquisition of other banks' lending in that market. For convenience, we often refer to lenders in the sample as banks, even though some are bank holding companies or stand-alone thrifts. Data on bank characteristics are taken from the quarterly bank and thrift Call Reports. These data include total assets, tangible equity capital, and delinquencies on loans other than home mortgages
We define multi-market banks as banks that originate mortgages in more than one U.S.
city. We allow a single-market bank to make up to 1 percent of its mortgage loans in another metropolitan area. This definition provides the cleanest split between the group of banks that are 12 operating in multiple markets and those that are only operating locally. The analysis focuses on the change in multi-market bank lending from the pre-crisis period (2006 and 2007) to the crisis period (2008 and 2009) . We restrict our sample to bank-market observations for which portfolio originations were positive in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This focuses the analysis on the infra-marginal decision of banks to increase or decrease their lending in markets where they are consistently originating new mortgages. Table 1 presents statistics on the dollar volume of mortgage originations by type of bank and type of lending. Three facts are apparent from this table, which describes the same data used in our empirical analysis. First, though single-market banks represent almost a quarter of banks in the sample, they account for only a tiny fraction of total mortgage originations due to their small size. Second, while portfolio lending declined at both types of banks in the sample from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period, the decline was especially great at the multi-market banks that account for the vast majority of mortgage loans -66.3 percent. The overall magnitude of the decline in portfolio lending at multi-market banks suggests that the sample may provide a good opportunity for examining the effect of loan losses in depressed markets on a bank's lending in healthier markets. Third, at multi-market banks, securitized originations were about equal to portfolio originations in the pre-crisis period and exceeded portfolio originations during the crisis. This fact raises the possibility that above-average declines in local portfolio lending by some banks due to spillover effects may have been offset by below-average declines in local securitized lending by the same banks. Estimating our regression equations for total originations provides a check against this possibility.
Our mortgage delinquency data come from the TransUnion Trend Data on personal credit performance by county. These data are used to construct a measure of regional mortgage 13 defaults, which is the share of mortgage borrowers that are 90 days or more past due on their mortgage payments. We think these data provide a unique window into the local mortgage default shocks that were the source of major losses for many banks and thrifts. deteriorations in loan performance over the period. These cities changed from having relatively low default rates (yellow-shaded areas) to moderately high default rates (orange-shaded areas) in northern states, and to very high default rates (red-shaded areas) along the coasts and in the southern states. Some metro areas, however, experienced only modest declines in loan performance during the same period. These regional differences in the severity of the housing downturn highlight the advantages of using differences in multi-market banks' exposure to distressed housing markets to identify cross-market spillovers to lending.
We define "other loss rate" as the mortgage losses to which a bank was exposed other than in the local market. This variable is defined only for multi-market banks. A bank's other loss rate for a given market is a weighted average of the 90-day mortgage delinquency rates in all metro areas in which the bank originated loans in the pre-crisis period other than the market in question. The weight for each of these metro markets is the share of the market in the bank's total pre-crisis metro-area originations outside the market in question. In the descriptive statistics, we also report local loss rates, which are mortgage delinquency rates for the counties within a local market, weighted by each banks' lending across those counties.
We also differentiate each of the 14,491 bank/market observations in the sample by the share of the market in the bank's total pre-crisis portfolio originations. For multi-market banks, 14 we refer to a market that accounts for 50 to 99 percent of the bank's total portfolio originations as a "core" market for the bank.
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A market accounting for less than 50 percent of the bank's total originations is referred to as "peripheral." Among peripheral markets, a market representing less than 1 percent of the bank's originations is referred to as "highly peripheral" and markets accounting for 1 to 50 percent of originations as "moderately peripheral." These categories are designed to show how the response of bank lending to outside shocks may depend on how important the local market is to the bank. Table 2 presents statistics on bank size, growth in total mortgage originations, and mortgage loss rates, broken down by the degree to which the market is peripheral to the bank.
Not surprisingly, median bank size increases with the extent to which the market was peripheral to the bank. At one extreme, single-market banks in the sample had median assets of only $156 million at the end of 2007. At the other extreme, banks lending in markets that were highly peripheral for them had median assets of $72 billion. Table 2 also shows that the growth of total originations from pre-crisis to crisis was lower in markets that were more peripheral to the bank.
Median loan growth in log terms ranged from a high of 5.0 percent in single-market banks to a low of -93.2 percent in highly peripheral observations. Finally, although both local loss rates and other loss rates increased, the other loss rate went up only slightly more than the local loss rate in core markets but quite a bit more than the local loss rate in peripheral markets. The gap was especially great in highly peripheral markets, where the median change in the other loss rate was three times the median change in the local loss rate. Table 3 reports the correlations in the sample among the growth in originations and the two loss rates. The third column shows that in all three types of markets in which multi-market 15 banks originated loans, the growth in originations from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period was negatively correlated with the change in the other loss rate. Furthermore, the correlation was more negative in peripheral markets than in core markets, and more negative in highly peripheral markets than in peripheral markets. These results are consistent with the view that the spillover effect dominated the substitution effect, causing shocks to local housing markets to be transmitted across markets.
It is important to note in Table 3 that, for both core markets and peripheral markets, the correlation between the change in the local loss rate and the change in the other loss rate was highly positive. Furthermore, in both types of markets, the growth in originations was just as negatively correlated with the change in the local loss rate as with the change in the other loss rate. 3 These facts suggest that the negative relationship between the growth in originations in a market and the change in the loss rate in the bank's other markets could simply reflect a tendency for loan demand in all of the markets in which the bank lends to move in the same direction during the crisis. A major advantage of our empirical strategy is that it can control for this effect by comparing the loan growth in each market of banks with high other loss rates to the loan growth in the same market of banks with low other loss rates.
Empirical methodology
Our empirical methodology is designed to test the relative importance of two different effects of loan losses in outside markets on bank lending in local markets-the spillover effect and the substitution effect. Previous literature addresses how geographic diversification affects the sensitivity of bank lending to local supply and demand shocks (e.g., Morgan, Rime and Strahan 2004 , Becker 2007 , Keeton 2009 ), but our methodology focuses on the response of bank lending to supply and demand shocks outside the local market. In the spillover effect, the outside loan losses represent either a loan supply shock that causes the bank to reduce lending in all its markets or new information that causes the bank to reevaluate the creditworthiness of local borrowers. In the substitution effect, the loan losses reflect a loan demand shock in other markets-for example, a decrease in borrower creditworthiness in those markets that causes the bank to shift lending to the local market.
We test whether the spillover effect is more important than the substitution effect by observing the response of multi-market banks' portfolio lending in a market to increases in loan losses in the other markets in which they operate. If the spillover effect is more important, local portfolio lending should decline. On the other hand, if the substitution effect is more important, local portfolio lending should increase. However, even if the spillover effect does outweigh the substitution effect, the decline in portfolio lending could be partly or completely offset by an increase in securitized lending in the same market. Thus, an important part of our empirical strategy is to determine how increases in loan losses in other markets affect a multi-market bank's total lending in the market.
To estimate these cross-market relationships, we use the following regression specification: 
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The dependent variable is the log growth in bank i's mortgage originations in metro area m from the pre-crisis period (2006 and 2007 combined) to the crisis period (2008 and 2009 combined) . By focusing on the change in lending from pre-crisis to crisis, we can specify the regression as a cross-sectional comparison of the response in banks' lending to significant mortgage losses.
We control for local mortgage demand using market fixed effects. Specifically, the explanatory variables include a set of dummy variables for the 376 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in the sample, Market i,m . Although the HMDA data and TransUnion data are available at the county level, we define markets at the MSA level to be consistent with previous findings that MSAs are more appropriate geographic boundaries for measuring bank competition. Our use of market dummies is similar to international studies that use country fixed effects to control for loan demand (Kwaja and Mian 2008 , Schnable 2010 , and Cetorelli and Goldberg 2008 . We believe that this approach controls for local demand in a cleaner fashion than including an incomplete set of variables measuring local demand, such as the change in the local delinquency rate or the change in local housing prices.
The specification also includes controls for bank-level characteristics that could affect a bank's lending in all markets. Bank size is measured by the log of the bank's assets at the end of 2007. It is important to control for size in the regressions to be sure that declines in lending by multi-market banks do not just reflect a tendency for large banks to cut back lending more than small banks during the crisis.
To control for bank-wide loan supply shocks-those that are not specific to particular markets-we include in each regression measures of the change in the bank's book capital and In other words, we estimate the cross-market relationships by regressing the growth in a bank's mortgage originations in market m on a measure of the bank's exposure to other markets with high mortgage delinquency rates. We interact Other Loss Rate with Multi-Market Bank to identify the effect of greater mortgage losses in other markets on a bank's local mortgage lending.
The sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction of multi-market bank and other loss rate provides our test of the relative importance of the spillover and substitution effects. This coefficient is expected to be negative if the spillover effect dominates (multi-market banks reduce local lending when delinquency rates in their other markets increase). On the other hand, the coefficient should be positive if the substitution effect dominates (multi-market banks substitute lending in the local market for lending in other markets when delinquency rates in those markets increase).
We next estimate similar regressions that allow the effect of outside losses to depend on the degree to which the market is peripheral to the bank: The variables in (2) are the same as in equation (1), except that we now include core market and peripheral market variables.
In this specification, we consider the degree to which the market is peripheral to the bank.
As noted in the Introduction, banks should respond differently to outside shocks depending on the degree to which the local market is peripheral to the bank's overall lending. As defined 20 above, a core market is a market that accounts for 50 to 99 percent of a multi-market bank's total portfolio originations and a peripheral market is a market accounting for less than 50 percent of portfolio originations. These dummy variables enter the regressions in two ways-alone and interacted with the multi-market bank's other loss rate. We also run the regression with the peripheral markets broken out into highly peripheral markets (less than one percent of a bank's lending) and moderately peripheral markets (one to 50 percent of lending). The coefficients should be more negative or more positive, the more peripheral the market is to the bank-i.e. the greater is the importance of other markets in the bank's total loan originations.
We estimate these regressions for two categories of mortgage originations-portfolio loans and total loans. Portfolio loans are those originated and held on banks' books. Total loans are the sum of portfolio loans and securitized loans, which are those originated and sold to GSEs or to non-affiliates in the private sector. Estimating equations (1) and (2) for portfolio loans provides a good test of whether the spillover effect from outside economic shocks dominates the substitution effect. Estimating these same equations for total loans indicates whether banks offset the impact of outside economic shocks on their local portfolio lending by changing their local securitized lending in the opposite direction.
Lastly, we examine the channel of the cross-market effects through bank capital and banks' information about markets. These specifications are the same as equation (1) Residential Real Estate Loans is the dollar value of the bank's residential real estate portfolio held on the balance sheet and Total Equity is the dollar value of the bank's equity capital.
Therefore, the ratio of residential real estate loans to total equity (RRE/Equity) provides a measure of the size of the bank's mortgage holdings relative to its capital buffer. The interaction of this variable with multi-market bank and other loss rate provides a test of whether the spillover-effect is magnified by a bank's capital exposure to the residential real estate market. If bank capital is a channel through which the outside mortgage losses are transmitted to the local market, we would expect the coefficient on this interaction to be significant and of the same sign as the coefficient on other loss rate. We also expand equation (2) in a similar manner to determine whether the magnitude of the capital channel depends on the degree to which the market is peripheral to the bank.
Distance to Headquarters is the distance in miles of the local market from the bank's headquarters. We include this variable as a measure of the degree to which the bank is informed about borrowers in the local market. Banks lending do distant markets are at an information 22 disadvantage in those markets, because soft information about borrower quality is harder to collect at a distance (Mian 2006) . A bank with such an information disadvantage may rely more heavily on developments in other markets to form an estimate of the creditworthiness of local borrowers. As a result, the bank may reduce local lending more in response to outside shocks. Table 4 shows the regression results for equation (1), in which the dependent variable is the growth in portfolio loan originations from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. As described in the previous section, our main variables of interest are the interaction of our multimarket variables with the change in other loss rate. These interactions identify whether a multimarket bank's losses in other, non-local markets affects its mortgage lending in the local market. This is the main spillover hypothesis that we want to test.
Regression results

Loan growth from pre-crisis to crisis period
The three columns differ in how granularly we divide our observations on multi-market banks. In column 1, we treat all multi-market banks as a single category. In column 2, we divide observations on multi-market banks into two categories: Core Market and Peripheral Market. Lastly, in column 3, we separate out Highly Peripheral Market, which indicates a multi-market bank that does less than 1 percent of its mortgage lending in the local market, from Moderately Peripheral Market, which is all other Peripheral Markets. In all three cases, we interact the dummy variables for how peripheral the market is to the bank with the weighted average loss rate in the bank's other markets. These interactions allow us to determine if local lending responds differently to losses in other markets depending on the degree to which the local market is peripheral to the bank's overall lending.
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The first rows in Table 4 show the estimated coefficients for our three bank-level variables: size (log of total assets), the change in tangible common equity (TCE), and the change in the non-residential non-performing loan rate (NRNPL). Bank size is negative and significant in all three columns, suggesting that large banks reduced their mortgage lending more than small banks during the transition from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period.
Given that multi-market banks tend to be much larger than single-market banks, this is consistent with the basic descriptive statistics in Table 2 showing that multi-market banks dramatically reduced their mortgage lending in the crisis.
The changes in TCE and NRNPL can be thought of as bank-level supply shocks stemming from changes in a bank's overall health. The coefficient on the change in TCE is negative and statistically significant in all three columns, implying that increases in book capital reduce bank lending. This result was unexpected but is consistent with some previous findings on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation. For example, Berger and Bouwman (2006) find a negative relationship between capital and liquidity creation at small banks, which they note is consistent with the "financial fragility-crowding out" hypothesis of Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Gorton and Winton (2000) . The negative coefficient on the change in TCE in Table 4 could also reflect the fact that banks that increased capital before the crisis were conservative banks that reduced their exposure to mortgages faster than other banks during the crisis.
We find support for the idea that home mortgage lending decreased in response to higher delinquencies on loans other than home mortgages. The coefficient on the change in the nonperforming loan rate for non-residential loans is negative in all three regressions, indicating that banks reduced their home mortgage lending in response to losses on other types of loans, such as 24 commercial and consumer. This is our first evidence of spillover of loan losses to lending, but across different types of loan markets rather than different regions.
The first variable of interest for our hypotheses about the cross-market transmission of economic shocks is the interaction of the change in the other loss rate with the multi-market dummy in Column 1. The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction of the multimarket dummy and the change in the other loss rate provides support for the view that multimarket banking increases the vulnerability of markets to outside economic shocks. In particular, the result suggests that the spillover effect of outside loan supply shocks dominates the substitution effect of adverse loan demand shocks. A 50 basis-point increase in the other loss rate would be well within the range of median changes in this variable shown in Table 2 . The coefficient of -27.5 on the interactive variable indicates that such an increase in the other loss rate would be associated with about a 13.8 percent decrease in local lending. In other words, multi-market banks significantly reduced their lending in a local market when they suffered typical losses on their mortgage lending in other markets. We believe that this result provides a clean test of how a shock that is external to local demand can affect local lending through changes in bank loan supply.
Our next variables of interest are the interactions of the change in the other loss rate with dummy variables indicating the degree to which the local market is peripheral to the bank's lending operations. In Column 2, the coefficient on the interactions of the change in the other loss rate with Core Market and Peripheral Market are both negative and significant, but the coefficient on Peripheral Market is over one-and-a-half times as large and is significant at the 1 percent level. (The difference in the interaction coefficients is significant at the 5 percent level.).
The coefficient of -36.2 on the Peripheral Market interaction implies that a 50-basis point 25 increase in other loss rate would be associated with over an 18 percent drop in local lending.
These results indicate that a bank's mortgage losses in other markets have a bigger effect on its local market lending if the bank is doing less than half of its lending in the local market than if is doing more than half of its lending in that market. In other words, there appears to be a larger spillover effect in peripheral markets than in core markets.
Column 3 divides the multi-market observations still further to identify the spillover effect in highly peripheral markets. As described above, we define a market to be highly peripheral for a multi-market bank when the bank is doing less than 1 percent of its lending in that market. Interestingly, we find that the spillover effect increases as the local market becomes more peripheral. The coefficient on the interaction of Core Market with the change in the other loss rate is -22.8 and significant at the 5 percent level, but the coefficient on the interaction of Highly Peripheral with the change in other loss rate is -80.5 and significant at the 1 percent level. (The difference between the two interaction coefficients is significant at the 1 percent level.) The latter result implies that a 50-basis point increase in the other loss rate would be associated with a 40 percent drop in local lending in these highly peripheral markets, an effect almost four times as large as when the local market is a core market for the bank. Here we find support for our hypothesis that the spillover effect is greatest in markets that represent just a small percentage of a multimarket bank's overall lending.
Our results so far suggest that portfolio mortgage lending declines in response to higher delinquency rates in other markets. We interpret this result to be consistent with a local shock to the bank's capital being transmitted through the bank to other markets via the bank's internal capital market. However, it is possible that securitized mortgage lending may mitigate the 26 decline in portfolio mortgage lending by providing a means of mortgage origination which does not rely on the bank's balance sheet. If securitized lending fully replaced the portfolio lending in these situations, there would not be any significant real effects due to the cross-market spillover of shocks that we have identified. To determine whether the effect on securitized loans offsets the adverse effect on portfolio loans, we examine the response of total loan originations (portfolio and securitized loans) to economic shocks in other markets. Table 5 presents the regression results for the growth rate of total mortgage loan originations using the same three specifications as in Table 3 . The results for our bank-level variables are roughly consistent with our previous results, but the effect of the change in the bank's non-residential non-performing loan rate appears to be somewhat magnified. More importantly, we still find support for our spillover hypothesis when looking at total mortgage loans: multi-market banks reduce their total mortgage lending in response to increased losses in other markets. The coefficient on the interaction of the multi-market dummy and the change in the other loss rate in column 1 is -15.2 and significant at the 1 percent level. This estimate suggests that a 50 basis point increase in the other loss rate leads to a 7.5 percent contraction in the growth rate of total mortgage originations. This result suggests that securitized lending only partially offsets the reduction in portfolio lending following an increase in the loan default rates in other markets.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 indicate that, as before, the negative effect of the outside shock is bigger in more peripheral markets. The interaction coefficient for the core market is insignificant, indicating that a change in a bank's loss rate in other markets has no effect on the bank's total mortgage lending in the local market. The loss of significance when we include securitized loans suggests that banks increase their securitized lending to offset the spillover 27 effect on portfolio lending. This result makes sense for banks' core markets where they would want to protect their reputation and market share. The coefficients on the interactions of Moderately Peripheral Market and Highly Peripheral Market with the change in the other loss rate in column 3 are -15.6 and -46.1 respectively, both significant at the 1 percent level (the difference between the highly peripheral interaction and the core interaction is significant at the 1 percent level). The second coefficient implies that a 50-basis point increase in other loss rate would be associated with a 23 percent drop in local lending in these extremely peripheral markets. These reductions in lending are smaller than the reductions in portfolio lending, but still economically significant. This implies that banks use securitized lending somewhat to mitigate reductions of mortgage lending in peripheral markets, but not enough to completely undo the spillover effects of external losses.
The role of the real estate portfolio relative to capital
In our baseline specification, we analyze shocks to the bank, but we do not explicitly address the likely magnitude of the mortgage losses relative to the balance sheet of the bank. A long literature has considered the effect of capital shocks on bank lending (e.g., Bernanke and Lown) . Most of these papers have focused on banks' overall capitalization. This is partly due to the data limitations. Using our approach, we focus on banks' exposures to markets with significant mortgage defaults. We have found that banks significantly reduce lending in other markets in response to these shocks, but we can do more to show that these results are due to capital. We do this by interacting out measure of mortgage losses with each bank's ratio of residential mortgage loans to total equity. This ratio, which we will refer to as the "capital exposure" of the bank, captures the size of the bank's residential mortgage portfolio relative to its capital base. Table 5 shows the results for the specification in equation (3) with these interactions as well as peripheral interactions. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for portfolio loans and columns 3 and 4 show the results for total loans. The coefficient on capital exposure as a standalone variable is negative and significant, indicating that banks with greater capital exposure to the residential mortgage market prior to the crisis reduced their mortgage lending at a greater rate than other banks. This is consistent with these banks having less of a buffer to protect against future losses.
In this specification, our main variable of interest is the interaction of multi-market bank, other loss rate and the ratio of residential loans to total equity. As can be seen from column 1, this interaction is negative and significant, as is the interaction of multi-market bank and other loss rate. This indicates that banks with a large residential mortgage portfolio relative to equity reduced lending even more than other banks in response to mortgage losses in other markets.
Column 2 shows this result for markets of different degrees of periphery. The main effect is in moderately peripheral markets, where banks with a high degree of capital exposure reduce their lending by more than other banks. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction is insignificant for core markets and highly peripheral markets. The reason for the insignificant effect in core markets may be that the "cut and run" effect causes banks to contract lending more in peripheral markets than core markets whenever a decline in capital calls for a reduction in the bank's overall lending. In highly peripheral markets, the insignificant coefficient on the interaction of capital exposure with the other loss rate is harder to explain. One possibility is that lack of 29 information about local conditions causes outside losses to have an especially large "wake-up" effect in these markets, swamping any effect on local lending of a decline in overall capital.
Columns 3 and 4 of table 6 show the results for the capital exposure specification applied to total loans. The results are very similar to the results for portfolio loans. This similarity implies that the effect of a bank's capital exposure does not have a unique effect on portfolio lending relative to securitized lending. The result provides an interesting counterpoint to the differences between portfolio and total loans in our baseline results. While banks appear to reduce portfolio lending more than securitized lending in response to an outside shock, the response does not appear to differ based on the banks' capital exposures. Banks with a large real estate portfolio relative to equity reduced their portfolio lending and their securitized lending more than other banks in response to outside shocks.
The role of distance to headquarters
Information could also play a role in determining how banks respond to mortgage losses.
Bank lending is an information intensive process that requires knowing both the characteristics of the borrower and the characteristics of the local market. Although prime mortgage lending likely does not usually require as much information of this type as some other types of lending, such as small business lending, the information-gathering process can be important, especially in times such as the recent crisis. In the next specification, we consider the role of distance to headquarters as a measure of the bank's diminishing private information about a market. A bank is likely operating at an information disadvantage in markets that are far from their headquarters, because loan decisions tend to be made at higher levels of the organization for large banks (Stein 2002 , Mian 2006 . Table 7 shows the result of the specification in equation (4) which includes distance to headquarters as well as an expanded form for evaluating peripheral markets. Like table 6, columns 1 and 2 show the results for portfolio loans and columns 3 and 4 show the results for total loans. The coefficient on the standalone distance to headquarters variable differs across the specifications. The coefficient is positive and significant in the basic specification with the multi-market bank dummy and negative and significant in the expanded specification.
The main purpose of incorporating distance is to evaluate the role of information in the transmission of shocks through multi-market banks. While our previous results are consistent with a capital channel for these shocks, it is also possible that banks change their lending behavior in response to updates in their information sets. Mortgage defaults are a form of learning about the evolving credit risk of mortgages as an asset class. As banks experience mortgage defaults in one market, they may update their beliefs about the risk of mortgages in other markets. This would be an information channel for interconnectedness rather than a capital channel.
The interactions of distance to headquarters with other loss rate provide an interesting perspective on how the previous results differ by distance. In columns 1 and 3, the coefficients on the interaction of multi-market bank, other loss rate and distance to headquarters are negative and significant. These results indicate that the reduction in lending by multi-market banks due to external losses is greater when the market is further from the banks' headquarters. The results are consistent with banks having an information disadvantage in more distant markets. When a bank suffers losses in the mortgage market, it reacts even more strongly in markets that are further away.
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Columns 2 and 4 in table 7 show the role of distance to headquarters in markets of differing degrees of importance to the bank. There is no interaction of core markets with distance, because there are not enough observations of core markets that are not also headquarters markets. The interesting finding is that the role of distance for portfolio loans is primarily in moderately peripheral markets. The coefficient on the full interaction is -5.1 and significant at the 1 percent level. This result indicates that a bank experiencing an external mortgage default shock reduces its lending in moderately peripheral markets by even more when the market is more distant from the bank's headquarters. In contrast, the role of distance is insignificant in highly peripheral markets. As before, this finding may be due to banks in highly peripheral markets facing a severe informational advantage. In markets accounting for such a small share of their total lending, banks may not find it cost-effective to collect any information about local conditions. As a result, banks may base their local lending decisions entirely on developments in other markets, regardless of how close the market is to headquarters.
For total loans, the results are slightly different in the expanded specification (column 4).
In this column, the full interaction with distance for moderately peripheral markets is insignificant. The negative and significant coefficient for portfolio loans does not carry through, implying that the effect for securitized loans looks different. This can be seen clearly in the full interaction of distance with highly peripheral markets which becomes positive and significant.
In this case, banks experiencing external losses have a higher loan growth in highly peripheral markets that are further away from their headquarters. This implies that banks significantly increase the amount of securitized lending in distant, highly peripheral markets. 
Conclusion
The U.S. mortgage market collapse during the financial crisis raised new questions about how markets are interconnected. This paper studies the evidence for mortgage-market contagion across U.S. cities through multi-market banks. We examine how large mortgage default shocks in some metro areas of the U.S. spread to other metro areas through multi-market banks' lending decisions. This is an empirical question that could have two different answers. If mortgage defaults in outside markets reduce a banks' capital or its estimate of the creditworthiness of local borrowers, the losses could have a negative spillover effect by causing a contraction of local loan supply. Alternatively, if defaults in other markets signal a decline in borrower credit quality in those markets, the bank could substitute lending in the local market, causing an expansion of local loan supply.
Our results generally indicate the presence of a spillover effect across metro areas, with additional analysis shedding light on the mechanism of this transmission. Multi-market banks reduced their local mortgage lending in response to increased mortgage delinquency rates in other markets. This finding is consistent with the view that geographic diversification in banking increases the vulnerability of markets to outside economic shocks through spillovers of the shocks to local lending. We also find evidence that the spillover effect was bigger in multimarket banks' peripheral markets than their core markets. This finding shows that the exposure to contagion was greatest in local mortgage markets where the lending of multi-market banks was a small share of their total lending. Our results also suggest that the cross-market transmission of economic shocks was mitigated-but only partially--by a tendency for multimarket banks to increase securitized lending at the same time they reduced portfolio lending.
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Finally, we find evidence that the spillover of outside shocks occurred through both a capital channel and an information channel. Consistent with the capital channel, multi-market banks with a large amount of mortgages on their balance sheet relative to their equity buffer responded to outside mortgage shocks by contracting local lending more in their peripheral markets than in the core markets. But consistent with the information channel, outside mortgage shocks led to greater declines in lending in peripheral markets located far from a multi-market bank's headquarters than in peripheral markets located close to its headquarters.
As bank regulatory policy becomes more macroprudential in its focus, the issues addressed in this paper should raise some concerns about the exposure of local markets to contagion through multi-market banks. Geographic diversification of financial intermediaries may reduce the sensitivity of lending to local shocks, but the 'dark side' of geographic diversification appears to be an increased sensitivity of lending to shocks in other markets.
Regulatory policies addressing related issues have already been put in place following the crisis.
For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act requires all merger and acquisition applications by foreign banks to be reviewed based on the financial stability of the bank's foreign parent. Our results suggest that the stability of local bank lending can depend on the risk exposures of multi-market banks to other parts of the U.S. As regulators continue to examine the role of financial interconnectedness in the crisis, the financial linkages created across geographic markets by multi-market banks should also be considered as a possible source of contagion. Single-market banks are those that originated at least 99 percent of their home mortgage loans in a single market in 2006 -2007 banks are all others. The number of each type of institution in the sample is shown in parentheses. Sample is restricted to bank/market observations for which portfolio originations were positive in both pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Type of bank and type of lending Total originations are the sum of portfolio and securitized originations. The degree to which a market is core or peripheral to a multi-market bank depends on the bank's mortgage lending in the market as a share of the bank's overall mortgage lending. Local loss rate is the mortgage delinquency rate in the market and other loss rate is each multi-market bank's loss rate in other markets, weighted by lending. Sample is restricted to bank/market observations for which portfolio originations were positive in both pre-crisis and crisis periods. (1) and (2). The dependent variable is total loan growth, measured as the log growth in total mortgage originations (portfolio and securitized loans) from the pre-crisis period (2006 and 2007) to the crisis period (2008 and 2009) . Each specification has market fixed effects. All data are winsorized at the 1% level. Robust standard errors are in brackets, with *, **, and *** indicating significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
